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THREE VERSIONS OF TAX REFORM*
ALVIN  C. WARREN,  JR.t
My subject this afternoon is tax reform, which again rose to the
top  of the  U.S.  political  agenda  during last year's  presidential
campaign. My principal goal in this lecture will be to explore three
different versions of tax reform. In order to provide some context
for that exploration,  I would like to begin by briefly comparing
taxation in the United States to taxation in other industrialized
countries, focusing on three attributes of a mature tax system.
The first attribute is  the overall  level  of taxation. Although
rarely  emphasized  in American  political  discourse,  the  overall
level of taxation in the United States is much lower than in other
developed countries. In 1994, the most recent year for which com-
parative  figures  are  available,  the total  of all taxes, including
social security taxes, at all levels of government in the U.S. was
27.6% of gross domestic product.1 Of the twenty-eight developed
countries that made up the membership of the Organisation  for
Economic  Cooperation  and Development  (OECD),  only Turkey
and Mexico had lower overall levels of taxation. The OECD aver-
age  was  38.4% of gross  domestic  product,  while the European
Union average was 42.5%.2
*  George  Wythe  Lecture,  delivered  at the  William  and  Mary  School  of Law  on
April  10,  1997.
t  Professor of Law, Harvard  Law  School.
1.  See  ORGANISATION  FOR  ECONOMIC  COOPERATION  AND  DEVELOPMENT,  REVENUE
STATISTICS  OF  OECD  MEMBER  COUNTRIES,  1965-1995  74  (1996  ed.).
2.  See  id.
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Turning now from the overall level of taxation to a second at-
tribute, the type of taxes imposed, the United States also differs
from most other industrialized  nations.  Once  again, looking  at
1994, income  taxes provided  a comparatively high 44.6%  of all
American  government  revenue.'  Social  security  taxes  provided
25.5%,  sales  and other  consumption  taxes  17.9%,  and property
taxes  12%.
4  Most  other  developed  countries  rely  significantly
less  on  income  taxes  and  significantly  more  on  consumption
taxes.  On  average,  for example,  consumption  taxes  constituted
31.9%  of the  tax revenue  of OECD  countries  in  1994,  almost
twice  the  17.9% in  the United  States.5  To  a large  extent, this
difference is explained by the widespread adoption of value-add-
ed taxes over the last thirty years throughout the industrialized
world, with the notable exception of the U.S.
Focusing now particularly on income taxes, the third and final
tax system attribute that I want to emphasize is the relationship
between the individual  and  corporate income taxes.  The United
States  continues  to have  a so-called  classical  system of income
taxation,  under which income  earned  through corporations  can
be taxed twice, once when earned by the corporation and again
on distribution to shareholders.  Over the last thirty years, most
other  developed  countries  have integrated their individual  and
corporate  income  taxes into a single  system that is intended to
eliminate or reduce this double burden.6
This  brief international  comparison  of  tax  systems  can  be
summarized as follows: first, taxes in the U.S.  are lower than in
other industrialized  countries;  second, the U.S.  relies relatively
more  on  income  taxes  and  less  on  consumption  taxes  than  do
other industrialized  countries;  and, finally,  the  U.S.  is  one  of
very few  such  countries  that  continues  to  levy individual  and
corporate income taxes that are separate and cumulative.
Given that background, let me now turn  to three versions  of
tax reform in the U.S.  In each case, I plan to focus on the intel-
3.  See  id. at 77.
4.  See  id.
5.  See  id.
6.  See,  e.g.,  PETER  A.  HARRIS,  CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER  INCOME  TAXATION  AND
ALLOCATING  RIGHTS  BETWEEN  CoUNTRIES  561-789  (1996).
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lectual foundations  of tax reform, the use  of those ideas in the
political process,  and the level of understanding  of the ideas by
the tax paying public.
I.  IMPROVING  AN EXISTING  TAX BASE
The  first version of tax reform that I want to  explore is the
regular work of improving  an existing tax base.  Given the rela-
tive importance of income taxation in the United States, it is not
surprising  that "tax reform" in the  U.S.  generally  has  meant
refinement and improvement  of the income tax.
The  seminal  American  formulation  of the  concept  of income
for these purposes is the celebrated definition articulated by the
University  of Chicago  economist  Henry  Simons in the  1930s.7
Given  the centrality  of what has  come  to  be  called  the Haig-
Simons definition of income to our first version of tax reform, it
is worth quoting the concept in detail:
Personal  income  may be defined  as the algebraic  sum of (1)
the market value  of rights  exercised in consumption and (2)
the change  in the value  of the store  of property  rights be-
tween  the beginning  and  end  of the period  in  question. In
other words, it is merely the result obtained  by adding  con-
sumption during the period to "wealth" at the end of the peri-
od  and then subtracting "wealth" at the beginning. The sine
qua non of income is gain, as our courts have  recognized in
their  more  lucid  moments-and  gain  to  someone  during  a
specified time interval.'
The key idea in this quite  abstract formulation is that gains
or  increases  in  wealth,  from  whatever  source,  constitute  the
ideal personal income tax base, whether those gains are saved or
spent on current consumption. This idea is not, however, directly
translatable  into  an operational  income  tax, which  has always
7.  See  Richard  A.  Musgrave, In Defense of an Income  Concept, 81 HARV.  L. REV.
44, 47  n.7 (1967)  (indicating that an earlier  version  of the  concept  was proposed  by
George  Schanz  in Der Einkommensbegriff und die Einkommensteuergesetze, 13  FINANZ
ARCm[lv  1  (1896)  and  introduced  into  American  discussion  in  THE  FEDERAL  INCOME
TAX  (R. Haig  ed.,  1921)).
8.  HENRY  C.  SIMONS,  PERSONAL  INCOME  TAXATION  50  (1938).
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used transactions, such as the receipt of salary or sale of assets,
rather than mere changes in value, to trigger taxation.9
The Haig-Simons definition was thus but the beginning for our
first version of tax reform. The concept had to be translated into
operational terms to deal with questions such as the following:
(1)  Should  fringe  benefits  be  taxed  differently  from  salary
under an income tax?
(2)  Should  capital gains be  taxed  at a lower rate than other
income?
(3) How should capital cost recovery for machinery and equip-
ment be designed under an income tax?
(4) How should the income tax burden be affected by marital
or family status?
These and hundreds  of similar questions have been addressed
in a remarkable outpouring of writing on income tax policy since
the end of the Second World War. One of the notable features of
this literature is that it has been a joint enterprise of economists
and lawyers in the government, in the universities,  and in pri-
vate practice. For example, the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee published  an important compendium  of papers on "broaden-
ing the  tax base" in  1959.0  Academic  lawyers  and economists
debated  the  merits  of  a  "comprehensive  tax  base"  in  the
1960s."  Important  Treasury Department  studies  of tax reform
were  published  in  1969,12  1977, s  and  1984.'4  The  American
Bar Association  Section of Taxation  published an  evaluation  of
the proposed  model "comprehensive income  tax" in  1979."5  And
9.  See  I.R.C.  §  61  (West  Supp.  1997)  (defining  gross  income  in  terms  of
transactions  that  produce  the  income).
10.  See  SUBCOMM.  ON  TAX  POLICY,  JOINT  COMM.  ON  THE  ECON.  REPORT,  84TH
CONG.,  FED.  TAX  POLICY  FOR  ECON.  GROWTH  AND  STABILITY,  (Joint  Comm.  Print
1955)  (analyzing  the  focus  of tax  policies  and  the  impact of taxation  on  income  and
consumption).
11.  See,  e.g.,  BORIS  I.  BITTKER  ET  AL.,  A  COMPREHENSIVE  INCOME  TAX  BASE?  A
DEBATE  (1968).
12.  See  HOUSE  COMM.  ON  WAYS  &  MEANS  & SENATE  COMM.  ON  FIN.,  91ST  CONG.,
TAX  REFORM  STUDIES  AND  PROPOSALS--U.S.  TREASURY  DEP'T  pts.  1-4  (Comm.  Print
1969).
13.  See  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  THE  TREASURY,  BLUEPRINTS  FOR  BASIC  TAX  REFORM  (1977).
14.  See  U.S.  DEP'T OF THE  TREASURY,  TAX  REFORM  FOR  FAIRNESS,  SIMPLICITY,  AND
ECONOMIC  GROWTH  (1984).
15.  See  Special  Comm.  on  Simplification,  ABA,  Evaluation of the Proposed Model
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the Brookings Institution  organized  a series of joint tax reform
conferences  for  economists  and  lawyers  in  the  1970s  and
1980s. 6
As a result of all this intellectual activity, a broad consensus
developed  among tax policy professionals  about how the income
tax could be improved, given the assumption that income was to
be taxed. The short version of this consensus is that for reasons
of fairness, economic  efficiency,  and ease of administration,  the
income tax should ideally make as few  distinctions  as  possible
among different categories  of income and expenditure. According
to the consensus,  distinctions generally are to be avoided if they
treat  similarly  situated  taxpayers  differently,  if  they  distort
economic  decisions,  or if  they unduly complicate  legal rules  or
business transactions.
The fullest expression of this view was probably the character-
ization by Harvard  Law  School  Professor Stanley Surrey, then
serving as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy in
the Johnson Administration,  of deviations from the ideal as "tax
expenditures." 7  Surrey's  faith  in  the  consensus  view  was  so
strong  that he  thought  legislative  deviations  from  that view
should  be  analyzed  as the equivalent  of tax receipts  that had
been collected and then spent on tax-favored activities.
One result of all this work by tax policy specialists was that
whenever  political  conditions  ripened,  there  were  legislative
ideas  already available for tax reform in  the sense of improving
the income tax by eliminating distinctions among different kinds
of income.  One important  example  was the Tax  Reform Act of
1969,8  which followed  Surrey's  tenure  at Treasury,  and which
eliminated many tax preferences.
Comprehensive Income  Tax, 32  TAX  LAW.  563  (1979).
16.  See,  e.g.,  COMIPREHENSIVE  INCOME  TAXATION  (Joseph  A.  Pechman  ed.,  1977)
(describing  methods  to  broaden  the  tax  base  and  attempts  to  lower  tax  rates);
WORLD  TAX  REFORM:  A PROGRESS  REPORT  (Joseph A.  Pechman  ed.,  1988)  (discussing
tax  reform  in other countries  and  the  United  States's reaction  to  such measures).
17.  For the most  complete  development of the concept  by its  originator,  see  STAN-
LEY S.  SuRREY  & PAUL  R.  MCDONALD,  TAX  EXPENDITURES  (1985).
18.  Pub.  L. No.  91-172,  83  Stat.  487  (1969)  (amended  1986).
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The  most recent  example  of tax reform  in this sense is the
Tax Reform Act  of 1986."9 Prior to  1986, the highest individual
tax rate was  50%,  and the  general  corporate  rate was  46%.20
Those  nominal  rates,  however,  were  mitigated  by  a  series  of
special provisions, including accelerated  depreciation  for invest-
ment in machinery  and equipment, as well as preferential  treat-
ment of capital gains  on certain investments. The tax advantag-
es for  some  investment  activities  were  marketed  as  "tax shel-
ters"  to investors  who had  little interest  in the tax-preferred
business other than the tax advantage.
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Democrats interested in broad-
ening the tax base united with Republicans  interested in reduc-
ing tax rates to implement the fullest application to date of the
first  version  of  tax  reform."  A  plethora  of  special  provisions
were  eliminated,  including tax shelters for individual  investors
from outside tax-preferred businesses. The drive to broaden the
tax base by reducing distinctions  even led to the elimination  of
preferential  treatment  of capital  gains,  a mainstay  of the  tax
system  since  1921.  The  Act  set the top  individual  rate  on  all
realized  income,  including  capital  gains,  at  28%."  The  1986
legislation, which reflected the typically American penchant  for
low taxes, initiated a process of reform in many other countries
that resulted in lower income tax rates abroad.
The  year  1986 marked  the high-water mark  of the first and
traditional  American  version  of tax reform.  The  top  statutory
rate for individuals  has increased  to  39.6%,3 while  the capital
gains rate has remained at 28%, reintroducing a preference that
congressional  leaders have pledged to  enlarge  during this  Con-
gress.  President  Clinton's  budget  proposals  similarly include  a
series of new tax expenditures,  particularly for education.'  The
19.  Pub.  L. No.  99-514,  100  Stat.  2085  (1986).
20.  See  § 804,  83  Stat.  487;  I.R.C.  §  11(b)  (.954).
21.  See  JEFFREY H.  BIRNBAUM  & ALAN  S.  MURRAY,  SHOWDOWN  AT  GUCCI  GULCH:
LAWMAKERS,  LOBBYISTS  AND  THE  UNLIKELY  TRIUMPH  OF  TAX  REFORM  (1987)  (describ-
ing  the  bipartisan  efforts  to  pass the  Tax  Reform  Act  of 1986).
22.  See  I.R.C. §  1(a)-(d)  (West  1988)  (defining applicable  rates  for tax years  before
1987).
23.  Effective  rates  can  be  higher  due,  for  example,  to  the  phase-out  of  personal
exemptions  and itemized  deductions.  See  I.R.C.  §§  68,  151(d)  (West Supp.  1997).
24.  See  STAFF  OF  THE  JOINT  COMM.  ON  TAXATION,  DESCRIPTION  OF  REVENUE  PRO-
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traditional  view of tax reform is, however,  far from  moribund.
Legislation  proposed  by Representative  Richard  Gephardt,  the
Minority Leader of the House, and a likely Democratic presiden-
tial candidate in 2000, is probably the most prominent manifes-
tation of this view today.'
What conclusions  can we  draw about the first version of tax
reform, which has been so important in the United States  over
the last half-century?  As  one would  expect, the process  of im-
provement of the income tax has been  continuing  and gradual.
Among tax policy  experts, there has been time to work out the
relevant ideas in some detail, allowing a considerable consensus
to develop. Among political leaders, there has been regular inter-
est  in  the  subject  and  episodic  implementation,  particularly
when reform could be coupled with rate reduction. Finally, given
the long history of the U.S.  income tax, public understanding  of
these issues has been fairly widespread.
II.  INTRODUCING  A NEW  TAX
I want now to turn to a second version of tax reform. Rather
than the incremental  improvement  of an  existing tax, this sec-
ond version involves the revolutionary  introduction of an entire-
ly new tax. The last time such a revolution occurred in the U.S.
was the  adoption  of the  Sixteenth  Amendment  to  the Consti-
tution in 1913,  which  authorized  the enactment  of the federal
income tax that I have been discussing so far.
As  you  recall from the  1996  presidential  election,  there  are
those in public life who argue that the moment has now arrived
for another such revolution.  They would  repeal the  income tax
enacted  in  1913  and  replace  it  with  something  else.  As  Steve
Forbes put it in the announcement of his presidential  campaign:
"[Sicrap  the income  tax. Don't fiddle with it.  Junk it. Throw  it
out. Bury it.  Replace  it with  a pro-growth,  pro-family  tax cut
VISIONS  CONTNUED  IN THE  PRESIDENT'S  FISCAL  YEAR  1998  BUDGET  PROPOSAL  4-16
(Comm.  Print  1997).
25.  See  ITax  Warfare,' INVESTOR'S  Bus.  DAILY,  July  13,  1995,  at  B1,  available in
LEXIS,  News  Library,  Arcnws  File  (printing  excerpts  from  Richard  A.  Gephardt,  A
Democratic  Plan  for  America's  Economy:  Toward  a  Fairer,  Simpler  Tax  Code,  Re-
marks Before  the  Center  for National  Policy  (July 6,  1995)).
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that  lowers  tax  rates  to  17  percent  across  the  board."6  Al-
though  the  rhetoric  deployed  in  this  version  of tax reform  is
more revolutionary, this second version shares with the first the
American preference for low taxes.
If we junk the income tax, what is to replace it? Recall that the
U.S.  differs  from  other developed  countries  in the relative  em-
phasis  given  income  taxation  as  compared  with  consumption
taxation. Although  sometimes  packaged  differently, the leading
proposals  for revolutionary  change  are essentially proposals  to
eliminate that American  specificity by replacing the federal in-
come tax with a consumption tax. Before considering the details
of these proposals, let me briefly sketch their intellectual history.
You will recall that the key idea of the Haig-Simons  definition
of income  is  that  individuals  should  be  taxed  on  all  income,
whether saved or spent on current consumption. There is a long-
standing,  alternative  intellectual  tradition,  according  to which
income  saved  should  be  omitted  from  the  tax base.  Thomas
Hobbes  so argued on the grounds that income  saved was left in
the  "common  pool"  of  society,  thereby  providing  capital  that
would increase both future production and the future productivi-
ty of workers."  For Hobbes,  it  made sense  to tax citizens  only
when they withdrew resources from this common pool. The yard-
stick for measuring  economic  well-being for tax purposes would
therefore be spending,  or consumption, rather than earnings,  or
income.
John  Stuart  Mill  argued  for  a similar  result on  the  ground
that it  was  double  taxation  to  tax  a wage-earner  on both  the
wages  received  and  the  income  produced  by  investing  those
wages."  The American  economist  Irving Fisher made  the same
point in terms of present value: the taxes paid by a worker who
immediately  consumes  all  his  income  will be  lower in present
value than the taxes paid by a worker who saves to consume in
26.  Steve  Forbes,  Flat Tax  Flap: GOP  Candidate Promotes  17% Rate  as Pro-
Growth, Pro-Family,  SEATTLE  POST-INTELLIGENCER,  Feb.  18,  1996, at El, available in
1996  WL  6436132  (reprinting  excerpts  from  his  Presidential  Announcement  Speech,
Remarks  Before  the  National  Press  Club  (Sept.  22,  1995)).
27.  See  THOMAS  HOBBES,  LEVIATHAN  226  (M.  Oakeshott  ed.,  1960).
28.  See JOHN  STUART  MILL,  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY,  bk.  V, ch.  I,  §  4
(Laughlin ed.,  1898).
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a later period, because the saver will owe additional taxes on the
income  produced  by his  savings.  Fisher concluded  that "such a
system of taxation is  clearly unjust and  discourages  the saver,
while it encourages the spendthrift."29
In  1955,  the British economist  Nicholas  Kaldor  published  a
book  entitled  An  Expenditure  Tax  that  rekindled  interest  in
these ideas."  Ever since, there has been a lively debate in the
tax policy literature about the relative merits of income and con-
sumption taxes."'
Before  turning to that debate, I want to point out that there
are two principal ways to implement a tax on consumption rath-
er  than income.  The  first is transactional.  A tax on  all  retail
sales, would, for example, tax annual consumption at a flat rate.
The value-added  taxes  (VATs) that have  swept the rest of the
world  in the last thirty years  accomplish  the same  result  by
collecting  a portion of the tax at each stage  of production.  One
disadvantage  of a retail sales tax or VAT is that it is difficult to
personalize. Rates cannot be set as a function of an individual's
personal or economic situation because the tax is levied on sales,
rather than individuals.
The second method of implementing  a consumption tax over-
comes this difficulty. Recall  that under the Haig-Simons  defini-
tion, income can be thought of as savings plus consumption.  Ac-
cordingly, personal  consumption could be taxed by starting with
income  and then  subtracting  all  savings."
2  This  personal  con-
sumption or expenditure tax could be graduated  or adjusted for
family circumstances,  as is the income tax.
29.  IRVING  FISHER,  THE  NATURE  OF  CAPITAL  AND  INCOME  253  (1906).
30.  NICHOLAS  KALDOR,  AN  EXPENDITURE  TAX  (1955).
31.  See,  e.g.,  WHAT  SHOULD  BE  TAXED:  INCOME  OR  EXPENDITURE?  (Joseph  A.
Pechman  ed.,  1980).
32.  For  a  discussion  of the  design of such  a  tax,  see  DAVID  F.  BRADFORD,  UNTAN-
GLING  THE  INCOME  TAX  75-99  (1986);  INSTITUTE  OF  FISCAL  STUDIES,  THE  STRUCTURE
AND  REFORM  OF  DIRECT  TAXATION  (1978);  KALDOR,  supra note  30; U.S.  DEPT  OF  THE
TREASURY,  supra note  14;  William  D.  Andrews,  A  Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income  Tax, 87  HARV.  L.  REV.  1113  (1974);  Michael  J.  Graetz,  Implement-
ing a Progressive Consumption Tax,  92  HARV.  L.  REV.  1575  (1979);  Special  Comm.
on Simplification,  supra note  15.
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Given  these  alternative  implementations, 3 consumption  tax
proponents have argued for the superiority of their tax using the
three traditional norms of tax policy: fairness, economic efficien-
cy, and administrative  simplicity. The consumption tax is said to
be fairer because it does not discriminate against taxpayers, like
Fisher's savers, who prefer to defer their consumption. It is said
to be economically superior because it does not reduce welfare or
discourage  savings  to the same extent as an income  tax, and it
is said to be  simpler because many of the complexities  of calcu-
lating income could be avoided. One such simplification would be
the elimination  of the income tax concept of basis, which would
always be zero if all savings were deductible.
Income tax proponents  have responded that the consumption
tax  would  be  regressive  and therefore  unfair,  because  higher
income  individuals  save more.  They further argue that the  evi-
dence that the income tax actually reduces savings is weak. And
they suggest that the income tax could also be much simplified if
the first version of tax reform were pursued more assiduously.
Given this background, let us now turn to the two most prom-
inent  proposals  for radical  change  by  replacing  the  American
emphasis  on  income  taxation  with  consumption  taxation.  The
first is the "Flat Tax," which was much talked about during the
33.  Under  certain  circumstances,  a  third  method  for implementing  a consumption
tax  would  be  simply  to  exempt  capital  income  from  the  income  tax.  This  approach
best  can  be  illustrated  with  a  numerical  example.  Suppose  that you  have  $1000  in
wages.  You  plan  to  put  the  wages  in  a  savings  account  and  consume  the  annual
10%  interest  return.  Suppose  further  that  we  wanted  to  levy  a  30%  tax  on  your
annual  consumption.  Under  the first alternative  described  in the text, you  could put
the  $1000  in the  savings  account  and  would have  $100  in  annual  interest and  $70
in  annual  after-tax  consumption,  having  paid  a  retail  sales  or  value-added  tax  on
your purchases.  Under the  second  alternative, inclusion  of your wages  in  the  person-
al  consumption  tax  base  would  be  offset  by  the  deduction  of your  savings,  so  you
also would  have  $1000  in the  savings account,  which would  produce  $100  subject  to
tax  each  year,  again  leaving  you  with  $70  in  after-tax  consumption.  Now  suppose
that  capital  income  was  simply  excluded  from  the  income  tax  base.  Your  wages
would  be taxed,  so you would  only have  $700  to put in  the savings  account.  But the
annual  interest  on  the  account  would  not be taxed,  so you  would again  have  $70  in
annual  consumption  after  all  taxes.  This  equivalence  leads  some  analysts  to  argue
that a personal  consumption  tax  can be  equivalent in  present value  to a wage tax if
tax rates  are  unchanged.  The  other  conditions  necessary  for the  equivalence  to  hold
are  discussed  in RICHARD  MUSGRAVE,  THE  THEORY  OF  PUBLIC  FINANCE  262,  266-67
(1959);  Graetz,  supra note  32,  at 1601-06.
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last presidential  election and which has been introduced in Con-
gress by Representative Dick Armey, the Majority Leader of the
House  of  Representatives.'  The  second  is  the  "USA  Tax,"
which  was  developed  under  the sponsorship  of Senators  Pete
Dominici and Sam Nunn. 35
The Flat Tax was  originally  advanced  by two  Stanford  aca-
demics, Robert Hall and Alvin  Rabushka.5  There  are two parts
to the tax, a business tax and an individual tax. Under the first,
all businesses,  whether  incorporated  or  not, would include  all
sales in the tax base and deduct all purchases  from other busi-
nesses, including purchases  of capital equipment. Pausing for a
moment at this point, we can ask what is the aggregate base of
such a tax? Because all purchases from businesses are also sales
by  businesses,  deductions  by  the  purchasing  businesses  are
offset exactly by inclusions of the  selling businesses.  Hence the
only  transactions  that  are  taxed  are  sales  by  businesses  to
nonbusinesses,  i.e.,  retail  sales.  As  far  as  we  have  gone,  the
aggregate base of the Flat Tax is simply retail sales. Indeed, tax
specialists would classify the tax as a "subtraction-method" val-
ue-added tax.
There is, however, an additional wrinkle to the Flat Tax. Busi-
nesses can also deduct wages, which are the only receipts taxed
to wage-earners. If these businesses' deductions are fully offset by
wage-earners'  inclusions,  what  is the purpose  of this  wrinkle,
given  a flat rate of taxation?  It is to  allow  an exemption  for  a
certain amount of wages, in response to the objection that value-
added taxes are regressive  for lower-income taxpayers.  The Flat
Tax is accordingly the equivalent of a tax on value-added, plus a
government grant to eligible wage-earners to offset the burden of
the tax. If you do not remember the tax being discussed this way
during the 1996 presidential campaign, it is not because you have
forgotten the discussion. Rather, the candidates vaguely referred
34.  See H.R.  2060,  104th  Cong.  (1995).
35.  For  the  most  complete  description  of the  proposal  by  its  sponsors,  see  USA
Tax System: Description and Explanation of the  Unlimited Savings Allowance Income
Tax  System,  66  TAX  NOTES  1485  (1995).  The  legislative  version  is  S.  722,  104th
Cong.,  which  was  introduced  by  Senators  Pete  Domenici,  Sam  Nunn,  and  Bob
Kerrey on  April  25,  1995.
36.  See  ROBERT  E. HALL  &  ALVIN  RABUSHKA,  THE  FLAT  TAX (2d  ed.  1995).
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to a Flat Tax, which most of the press  and therefore the public
assumed was an income tax with flat rates.
The  second  prominent  proposal for radical  tax reform is the
"USA Tax," which  is  named  after  its principal  innovation,  an
Unlimited Savings Allowance. Again there are two taxes, one for
businesses  and  one for individuals. As under the Flat Tax, the
business tax is a subtraction-method VAT, but without the wrin-
kle of a deduction for wages. At the individual level, the design-
ers of the tax have tried to implement a graduated personal con-
sumption tax by starting with the income tax base and then per-
mitting  an  unlimited  deduction  for  all  savings.  The  USA Tax
would thus  levy two taxes,  one flat and  one graduated,  on the
same general base, personal  consumption.
I now want to compare  the Flat Tax and USA Tax on several
grounds. First, consider rates, which are low and not graduated
under the Flat Tax. Under the USA Tax, they are graduated for
individuals, with top rates near those of the current income tax
rates. What explains  this difference? The Flat Tax assumes that
all activity in the economy, including legal education at William
& Mary Law  School, will be  subject to  a tax rate of, say,  17%.
The  USA  Tax  assumes  that many  of the  activities  subject  to
favorable  treatment under the  current  income  tax will  also be
favored  under  a  consumption  tax, so  its  rates  are  necessarily
higher.
Second,  consider transition from the  existing income  tax to  a
consumption  tax. It might help to have in mind a retired wage-
earner  who is living  off savings  from her working  days. Under
an income tax, she would be taxed during retirement only to the
extent she earned additional income or withdrew previously un-
taxed  amounts from tax-favored  pension  plans. The income tax
concept  of basis  assures  that she would  not be taxed again  on
income taxed during her working days. Now suppose that a con-
sumption  tax  is  substituted  for  the  income  tax.  Should  our
retiree's  income tax basis protect  her from taxation  under the
consumption tax? If our answer is no, she will be taxed twice  on
the same gain. If our answer is yes, then consumption tax rates
will have to be higher to make up the lost revenue. The Flat Tax
opts for the first solution, which would involve  a major  shift of
tax burden from younger  to  older Americans.  Not  surprisingly,TAX REFORM
this aspect of the Flat Tax was not highlighted during the 1996
presidential campaign in Florida. The USA Tax avoids this shift
in  tax burden by opting for the second  choice, which is another
reason its rates are higher than under a Flat Tax.
Now  consider  international  transactions.  Should  a  sales  or
value-added  tax be levied  where the item is purchased  (on an
"origin" basis) or where it  is used (on a "destination" basis)? In
general, retail sales taxes and VATs  are levied on a destination
basis,  which is the choice made by the USA Tax. The Flat Tax
would, on the other hand, apply only to value added in  the Unit-
ed States. An American-made car would be subject to taxation in
the U.S. on its full value, whereas  a foreign-made car sold in the
U.S.  would be subject to taxation in  the U.S.  on only the profit
made by the American retailer. Although economists think that
currency exchange rates would adjust for such differences,  it  is
unlikely that U.S.  car manufacturers  would  agree. Not surpris-
ingly, this aspect of the Flat Tax was not highlighted during the
1996 presidential  campaign in  Michigan.  Once  again, the press
and public seemed quite unaware of how the proposed tax would
actually work.
Finally, consider complexity. The Flat Tax is simple, but that
is in part because many of the most  difficult problems,  such as
intergenerational  and international  issues, have been  assumed
away. The  USA Tax,  on  the other hand, is quite  complicated,
largely because it  stumbles on a key problem of consumption tax
design, which is that consumption out of borrowed  funds should
be taxed. This result is unsurprising under a retail sales tax or a
VAT, because the tax is due whether the purchases  are funded
with wages, savings, or borrowings.
Under a personal  consumption tax, which starts with income
and subtracts savings, the result is less automatic, because bor-
rowed money is not included in taxable income. Under the Haig-
Simons  definition  we  began  with,  borrowed  funds  are  not  in-
come, because they do not increase the borrower's net wealth. If
we want to tax consumption, however,  borrowed  funds have to
be included in the tax base. If those funds were saved, then the
net tax result would be  zero, because the deduction for savings
would  offset the inclusion  of borrowings.  The  designers  of the
USA Tax thought, perhaps correctly, that the American taxpay-
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ing public would not understand the inclusion  of borrowed funds
in the tax base, so they constructed a very complicated and prob-
ably unworkable system to limit deductions to amounts saved in
excess of borrowings."
Given President Clinton's reelection, neither the Flat Tax nor
the  USA  Tax is  very likely  to  be  enacted  during the  next few
years.  But, these ideas  are no  less moribund  than is the first
version  of  tax  reform.  I  would  expect  that  there  will  be
presidential  candidates  in 2000  who will again  propose  revolu-
tionary tax reform along these lines.
What conclusions can we draw regarding this  second version
of tax reform, which  seems to have become  important  in presi-
dential politics? Like the first version of tax reform, this version
is based  solidly on  a longstanding  intellectual  tradition, which
prefers consumption taxes to income taxes. Given the traditional
American  emphasis on income  taxation, however, there has not
always  been time for tax  policy specialists  to develop  the rele-
vant  ideas  in the detail  necessary  for  actual legislation  in the
U.S.  Among political  leaders,  there has  been episodic interest,
particularly  on  the  part  of leaders  who  want  to  distinguish
themselves by proposing  a revolutionary  form of tax reduction.
Indeed,  these  proposals  would  replace  one  form  of American
specificity (heavy reliance on income taxes) with another (virtual
elimination  of income  taxes), while other  countries  continue  to
depend on a mix of taxes. Finally, among the press and general
public, there seems  to be a high degree  of confusion about what
is actually under discussion.
III.  RELATIONSHIPS  BETWEEN TAXES
Let me now turn to  a third version  of tax reform, which in-
volves rationalization of the relationships between two tax bases.
A number of possibilities  come to mind, such as the relationship
between income  and social  security taxes,  or between state and
federal taxes. I want to focus today on the relationship between
the federal corporate and individual income taxes.
37.  See  generally Alvin  C.  Warren,  Jr., The  Proposal for an  "Unlimited Savings
Allowance,"  68 TAX  NOTES  1103  (1995)  (discussing the main  aspects  of the USA  Tax
and  criticizing  certain  elements  of the tax).
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As  I  mentioned  earlier,  the United  States  has  long  had  a
"classical" income  tax system, under which  income  is taxed to
corporations  and  shareholders  as  distinct  taxpayers.  Interest
paid to  suppliers  of corporate  debt capital is  deductible  by the
corporation, but dividends paid to shareholders  are not. Taxable
income earned by a corporation and then distributed to individu-
al  shareholders  as  a dividend is thus  taxed twice,  once  to the
corporation,  and again to the shareholder  on receipt of the divi-
dend. As a result, the current regime is often characterized  as a
"double tax" system.
The actual U.S. tax system is considerably more complex. For
example,  some  income  earned  through  corporate  enterprise  is
taxed  only  once,  at  the corporate  level.  This  is the result  for
corporate taxable income distributed as dividends to tax-exempt
shareholders, such as pension funds and charitable endowments.
Other income earned through corporate enterprise is taxed only
once, at the investor level. This occurs when corporate earnings
are  distributed  as  deductible  interest  payments  to  taxable
debtholders.  Finally,  some  income  earned  through  corporate
enterprise  is  not  taxed  in the  U.S.  at either  the corporate  or
investor  level. This is the result for  deductible interest paid to
certain foreign and tax-exempt holders  of U.S.  corporate debt. 8
Accordingly,  corporate  income  is sometimes  taxed twice  in the
U.S., sometimes  once, and sometimes not at all.
The  current  U.S.  system of taxing  corporate  income  distorts
several  economic  and financial  choices,  of which  the  following
four are usually considered the most important.
1. U.S. investors  are discouraged from investing in new corpo-
rate equity because of the additional burden of the corporate tax,
distorting  the  allocation  of capital  between  corporate  and non-
corporate investment.
2. U.S. corporations  are encouraged to finance new projects by
issuing debt or using retained  earnings, rather than by issuing
new  stock, in order  to avoid  an additional  level  of tax. The re-
sulting  higher  debt  levels  may increase  the  costs  of financial
distress.
38.  See  I.R.C.  §  871(h) (West Supp.  1997)  (exempting interest  paid to  foreign hold-
ers  of portfolio debt).
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3.  There  can be  a tax incentive  to retain or  distribute corpo-
rate earnings,  depending on the relationships  among corporate,
shareholder,  and  capital  gains  tax rates.  For  example,  if the
corporate and capital gains rates are sufficiently  low relative to
shareholder rates on ordinary income, the tax system encourag-
es retention of earnings by U.S.  corporations  to take advantage
of the lower rates.
4. The tax system encourages  U.S.  corporations  to distribute
earnings in tax-preferred transactions,  such as stock repurchas-
es  that  give  rise  to  capital  gains,  rather  than by paying  divi-
dends.
"Integration" of the corporate and individual income taxes has
come  to  mean  eliminating  the  double  burden  of the  corporate
and individual income  taxes, where it  exists, and substituting a
system in which investor and corporate taxes are interrelated in
a manner that eliminates  or reduces the foregoing distortions." 9
The goal is to produce a uniform levy on capital income, whether
earned through corporate enterprise or not.
The basic  argument for integration is economic. The classical
corporate  tax increases  the  cost  of capital for  U.S.  companies,
discourages new equity investments in corporate enterprise, and
encourages  the  issuance  of  corporate  debt.  According  to  the
Treasury, the U.S. tax burden on corporate capital, as compared
with residential  housing, has resulted in  a much lower ratio of
corporate  to residential investment in the U.S. than in other in-
dustrialized countries.0
Thirty  years  ago,  the  corporate  tax  systems  of most  other
major developed countries were similar to ours. In the last three
decades, however, most of our major trading partners have fully
or  partially  integrated  their  individual  and  corporate  income
taxes, usually through  a shareholder  credit for previously paid
39.  The  literature  on  integration  is vast. For  a  discussion  of two recent  proposals
(with  extensive  bibliographies)  for  integration  in  the  United  States,  see  ALVIN  C.
WARREN,  JR.,  FEDERAL  INCOME  TAX  PROJECT.  INTEGRATION  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL  COR-
PORATE  INCOME  TAXES:  REPORTER'S  STUDY  OF  CORPORATE  TAX  INTEGRATION  (Ameri-
can  Law  Institute,  1993)  [hereinafter  1993  ALI  STUDY];  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  THE  TREA-
SURY,  REPORT  ON  INTEGRATION  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL  AND  CORPORATE  TAX  SYS-
TEMS-TAXING  BUSINESS  INCOME  ONCE  (1992)  [hereinafter  1992  TREASURY  REPORT].
40.  See  1992  TREASURY  REPORT,  supra note  39,  at  5.
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corporate  taxes.  In  so  doing,  they have  reduced  the  economic
distortions that continue to exist in the U.S.41
While integration has been discussed periodically in the U.S.,
this discussion has not been identified  with any political party
or movement.  The Treasury Department has developed integra-
tion proposals  in both  Democratic  and  Republican  administra-
tions, and the House of Representatives included a small step to-
ward integration in its version  of the Tax Reform Act  of 1986.
Professional groups, including the American Law Institute, have
also  developed  proposals  to  eliminate  the  double  taxation  of
corporate income in the U.S.42
One might have thought that the reaction of the U.S.  corpo-
rate community to such proposals  would be  unbridled enthusi-
asm, particularly in a period of increasing international competi-
tion and given the American  predilection  for low taxes. In fact,
with rare  exceptions,  corporate  management  remarkably  has
been uninterested in proposals that would eliminate  the double
taxation of corporate income distributed to shareholders  as divi-
dends. Given the choice,  corporate management  seems to prefer
corporate  tax reductions  through  reduced  rates  or  accelerated
capital  cost  deductions,  rather  than  structural  changes  that
would reduce the biases  of our corporate tax.
I cannot fully explain this disinterest. Some analysts suggest
that even in the  competitive  American  capital markets,  corpo-
rate management simply does not act as a steward of sharehold-
er  interests. 43  On  this  view,  management  may  actually  prefer
some versions  of the double  tax, which  discourage the distribu-
tion of corporate  income, providing management with a pool  of
capital free of the rigors of the capital markets. Another possible
explanation  is  that  well-informed  taxpayers  can  mitigate  the
41.  Countries  with  fully  or  partially  integrated  tax  systems  include  Australia,
Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy, and  the  United  Kingdom.  For  a  recent comparison
of integration  systems,  see  HARRIS,  supra note  6, at  561-789.
42.  See  1993  ALI  STUDY,  supra note  39;  TAX  DIV.,  AMERICAN  INST.  OF  CERTIFIED
PUB.  AccoUNTANTs,  STATEMENT  OF  TAX  PoLIcY  10,  INTEGRATION  OF  THE  CORPORATE
AND  SHAREHOLDER  TAX  SYSTEMS  (1993).
43.  See,  e.g.,  Jennifer  Arlen  &  Deborah  M. Weiss,  A  Political Theory of Corporate
Taxation, 105  YALE  L.J. 325,  368  (1995)  (suggesting that the  gap  between  corporate
ownership  and management  affects the  integration  debate).
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burden  of the  double  tax. One  important  development  in this
regard  has  been  the  creation  by  state  legislatures  in  recent
years  of a new  business form,  the Limited  Liability  Company,
which allows closely held companies to obtain the advantages  of
limited liability without being subject to the federal income tax
on  corporations."  Even public  companies,  which  cannot escape
the  corporate  tax in  this  way,  have  been  more  aggressive  in
finding ways  to  distribute  earnings  as deductible  interest  pay-
ments  or  as  share  purchases  taxed  as  capital  gains. 45  Finally,
some  would  argue  that much  of the burden  of the existing tax
system  has  already been  capitalized  in share  prices,  meaning
that at least some of the burden may have been borne by previ-
ous owners  of shares. In spite of these explanations, it is some-
thing  of a  mystery why the United  States  remains  one  of the
very  few  industrialized  countries  that has  not  integrated  its
individual and corporate income taxes.
In the absence  of support from corporate management, there
has been very little interest in corporate tax integration on the
part of political leaders. The third version of tax reform is thus
characterized  by a detailed elaboration  of the relevant ideas by
tax policy specialists, disinterest on the part of political leaders,
and, I think it is fair to say, almost complete  ignorance on the
part of the general public.
IV.  CONCLUSION
To  summarize,  I have  spoken  today about  three  versions  of
tax reform:  improvement  of an  existing tax, replacement  of an
existing tax by something radically different, and rationalization
of the relationships between  taxes. In the United  States, those
three  versions  of tax reform  have  been  manifest  in the  long-
standing  movement  to  broaden  the income  tax base, in recent
interest in substituting  consumption  taxation for  income  taxa-
44.  See,  e.g.,  Susan  Pace  Hamill,  The  Limited Liability Company: A  Catalyst Ex-
posing the  Corporate Integration Question, 95  MICH.  L.  REV.  393  (1996)  (discussing
the  benefits  of the  Limited  Liability  Company  for tax  reform).
45.  See,  e.g.,  Laurie  Bagwell  & John  B.  Shoven, Cash Distributions to Sharehold-
ers, 3  J. ECON.  PERSP.  129  (1989)  (discussing the problems  with  using noncash  divi-
dends  and  advocating  the  increased  use  of cash distributions  as  a replacement).
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tion, and in proposals  to integrate  the individual  and corporate
income  taxes.  In  all  three  cases,  the American  preference  for
lower taxes has been manifest.
Tax policy experts have served an important function in devel-
oping the ideas  necessary  for all  three  versions  of tax reform.
However, the expert tax policy community has sometimes done
an inadequate job of communicating the content of these ideas to
the public (particularly about current proposals for revolutionary
reform) and to the  country's  corporate  and  political leadership
(particularly  about important  relationships  between  individual
and corporate taxes).
Happily,  it  is  not  too  late  to  correct  these  deficiencies.  All
three versions of tax reform remain unfinished. And for those of
you who  are  interested  in the revolutionary  version,  the  next
presidential election is only a few years away.